I am, as I’ve probably made sufficiently clear, a theonomist. I am also a Presbyterian, whatever my quarrels with certain parts of the tradition may be. I can offer only slightly-qualified endorsement to the 1788 Westminster Confession of Faith. But, as a theonomist, do I trespass the Westminster Confession of Faith? The PCA’s recent report certainly says I do, inasmuch as I believe Deuteronomy 13 ought to be applied in our civil governance (pg 24), and the PCA is an honorable (honorary) man. But, when we look at the confession, what hermeneutic does it recommend?

General Equity & Expiration

The WCF says thus: “To them also, as a body politic, he gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the State of that people; not obliging any other now, further than the general equity thereof may require” (19.4). The three critical terms, the ones whose meanings are not treated as clear by all participants in this discussion, are ‘general,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘expired.’ Each of these has a meaning; to none of these does the PCA’s recent report give clear definition (or even unclear definition). So we need to ask: what do they mean?

‘Equity’ is the simplest; we’ll take it first. ‘Equity’ is justice, the principles of justice. In law, since well before 1788, ‘equity’ has been the name of the set of principles by which courts ostensibly seek to deliver the justice which statutory law has failed to deliver. The drafters of the 1646 and 1788 versions (both of which include this section) would have been well aware of this. So, both the plain meaning of the word and a well-known technical use concur: ‘equity’ is ‘that which is just’ or ‘principles to find justice.’

(If the PCA or similar organizations proposes to dispute these, it must do three things: (1) bring strong proof that ‘equity’ was not so understood at the time; (2) explain why it has not amended its confession to be comprehensible to those who (like me) are well-versed in theology but have not made in-depth specialist study of the era; and (3) admit to having neglect to clarify their own confession, allowing confusion and misunderstanding to appear in the flock under their care, contrary to their stated duty.)

‘General,’ next, is a little more complicated. ‘General equity,’ as distinguished from ‘particular equity,’ would amount to not so much abrogation as a refusal to apply if the distinction meant equity could only apply outside of specific situations (i.e. reality), contrary to 1 John 1:5-10, Romans 3:8, and James 1-2. A more convincing thesis is that ‘general’ refers to the fact that, whereas much of the civil law in Scripture is case law and all of it is ‘particular’ in some way, proper interpretation requires us to recognize the broader (more ‘general’) principles underlying the commands, to recognize them and then to apply them to particular situations. Just such an analysis is plainly seen in the Larger Catechism’s analysis of the Decalogue.

‘General equity,’ then, is the recognition of the principles of justice (equity) of which the specific civil law is a particular application (general). If this ‘general equity’ is ‘obliging’ (that is to say, binding or authoritative), then the civil law’s principles are according to the WCF 1788 applicable to civil magistrates, insofar as they are relevant. Commands such as Leviticus 20:10 (to execute the adulterer), abstracted from their particular context as Israel’s moral law for the civil state, would produce the principle, ‘The civil state ought to execute proven adulterers,’ a principle then binding on the civil magistrate. The only way to avoid this is to show how the differences between our circumstances and Israel’s are such that the civil portion of the law ought to be omitted by our application.

In the Preface to the Second Edition of his book Theonomy in Christian Ethics (which I highly recommend), Bahnsen lays out the distinctive doctrines of theonomy. While more comprehensive than the ideas noted above (ranging out across WCF 19 and into other sections), the list, particularly items 9 and 10, essentially restates the view which I have found described by ‘general equity’ above. Indeed, the only point at which its view of the judicial law seems to diverge from the WCF quoted above is in point 4, which asserts that we should presume the Old Testament’s commands continue to be binding in the New Covenant era, unless given particular Scriptural guidance to the contrary. This seems at least potentially contrary to the WCF’s ‘expired.’

The contradiction only materializes, however, if Scriptural grounds for ‘expired’ fail to materialize. If we look at theonomy’s prescribed hermeneutic, however, we have already found that it is ‘general equity’ as common sense interprets those two words, albeit generally with a refusal of ‘natural law’ not necessitated (but consistent with) ‘general equity’ as a doctrine. Theonomy does indeed believe that the Old Testament judicial laws have ‘expired’ in a sense (inasmuch as the Israelite order of Moses has ‘expired’ by going dodo-ward). That sense, however, does not result in an abolition of their applicability to the modern day, of their authority- a verdict ‘general equity’ agrees with. The difference, if there is any, lies not in the hermeneutic but in finding, upon applying it, that the principles of the civil law are truly and thoroughly applicable to civil government.

But, if you remember, the WCF does apply the principles of the judicial (civil) law to civil government; it says they are “obliging,” an old-timey way of saying, ‘authoritative.’ So, the WCF’s divergence from theonomy must be in how much applicable material is present in the Old Testament law, particularly (according to the PCA) in the specific penal recommendations.

Deuteronomy 13

The PCA has said that theonomy is different from ‘general equity,’ as seen in their understanding of Deuteronomy 13, and the PCA is an honorable man (not to mention honorary, for the sake of an allusion I’ve been waiting literal years to fit into an article. Does it fit perfectly? No. But I use it nonetheless). General equity, the PCA has said, would not apply Deuteronomy 13 to justify capital punishment (pg 24). Theonomy does. Why? Because the principles of justice expressed in that passage, when we remove them from their Israelite context, place a duty on the civil magistrate to by execute (1) true prophets who use their gift to promote idolatry and (2) those who promote idolatry in secrecy, rather than openly declaring their hostility to God. But that, you recognize, is the procedure of general equity….

Coming to the question of the specific penal recommendations in general, the procedure of general equity’s hermeneutic requires us to recognize that in the original circumstances, those punishments were precisely just. Then, it requires us to consider how our circumstances are modified, so as to require modifications in how we apply the principles of that law. In dealing with adultery, for instance, is the nature of man, of marriage, or of the civil polity so changed that Leviticus 20:10 does not teach us the most just punishment?

A Potential Difference

Now, I can see one potential difference. I, as a Christian, hold that “The rules of the Lord are true, and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold, even much fine gold; sweeter also than honey and drippings of the honeycomb. Moreover, by them is your servant warned; in keeping them there is great reward” (Ps. 19:9-11). I believe wholeheartedly that “not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the Law” (Matt 5:17-18). The judicial and the ceremonial law of the Old Testament is still fully authoritative. It must, however, be read in context of the whole of Scripture, which makes clear to us that the civil law must be applied with awareness of circumstance and that the ceremonial law is fulfilled in Christ or replaced by new rituals.

General equity could depart from this by holding that the Old Testament laws are not just to be applied differently but actually devoid of authority, acting only as indicators of righteousness, not as commands. Frankly, while it wouldn’t change the application one whit (if we’re honest), that’s a large step towards heresy. It is literally a denial of the binding authority of a part of Scripture, something no Christian ought to abide. It’s also contrary to the ‘obliging’ part of the WCF, unless it’s read with culpable generosity of interpretation to mean ‘obliging’ only in the sense that good advice is obliging (because that’s what this would reduce Scripture to).

Sum

Theonomy’s hermeneutic for the Old Testament is ‘general equity’ as plain understanding would take the terms. There’s a reason we have ‘general equity theonomists’ nowadays. The only way to avoid this interpretation of general equity, note, is to plead that we oughtn’t to be applying the still-relevant principles of justice found in the Old Testament, that parts of His law are no longer authoritative. We can argue about which parts of the law are ‘expired’ (meaning, in which cases have the proper application of the same laws changed due to changes in circumstance). A few years ago, I would have argued Deuteronomy 13 was largely abrogated as it commanded the civil magistrate, and my hermeneutic then was the same, albeit less explicit in my thought. But the hermeneutic itself is the hermeneutic of the Westminster Confession of Faith- and, more importantly, of Scripture (Matt. 5:17-48; Acts 17:11).

God bless.