Is Theonomy New?
Is theonomy a novel doctrine in church history? According to Stephen Wolfe, it is novel at least to Reformed theology. To a very small extent, he succeeds. But he succeeds much less than he purports, going by the evidence he himself presents. Today, let’s look at what he states is the difference between ‘Westminster Confession of Faith general equity’ and ‘theonomy.’
He asserts three main differences: (1) Theonomy holds the judicial law still binding, whereas GE holds the judicial law to have expired without its moral weight being abolished; (2) Theonomy conflates the judicial and moral laws, while GE preserves the moral part of the judicial law; and (3) Theonomy either uses too little natural law or removes it entirely, whereas GE integrates it more than theonomy (131).
Let’s take them in order.
Wolfe states that ‘WCF general equity’ holds the judicial law expired- meaning it is no longer an operating law code, I think, though he really does not sufficiently define ‘expired’- but not abolished. Thus, its ‘general equity,’ its moral content, its wisdom for civil government (as per footnote 54, on page 139), this moral aspect of the judicial law remains to ‘oblige’ the civil magistrate. Nevertheless, while the civil magistrate is obliged to follow the moral parts of the judicial law (their work must not be “contrary to equity and piety” (132)), he is not bound by the judicial law itself.
The theonomic position, I assure you, is very different. “The magistrate,” a theonomist might say, “is obliged to those judicial laws which teach concerning matters which are immutable and universally applicable to all nations, but not to those which teach concerning matters which are mutable or peculiar to [Israel under self-governance]” (140). He might say that, but obviously he does not, for that was a quote from reformation theologian Johannes Piscator, as reproduced by Wolfe to show how different GE is from theonomy. The theonomist can’t have said that, because, well, Wolfe says Piscator was disagreeing with theonomy’s position in that quote.
No, the theonomy would say the following: ‘The civil magistrate is obliged (bound) to follow the judicial law insofar as it is not connected to parts of the law now abolished and with adaptation to the circumstances. This adaptation should be aimed to preserve the moral substance of the law, leaving aside what is mutable or peculiar to the originating circumstances (unless it matches current circumstances).’ If you’re asking how that differs from what Wolfe depicts WCF general equity to be, join the crowd; I haven’t the foggiest. On this point of asserted difference, at least, the mismatch seems to rest almost entirely in semantics, with the ‘real’ part of the disagreement being of the sort which two theologians of the same school often have with each other (like which parts of the judicial law have respect to the mutable or how to adapt the moral principles).
Wolfe says that theonomy blurs the division between ‘judicial’ and ‘moral’ laws. Well, guilty in a way. I certainly find the distinction worthless; I’d subdivide the moral law into different spheres- family moral law, state moral law (judicial law), ecclesiastical moral law (like Titus 1), personal moral law, etc, with plenty of overlap on what commands go where. But that’s semantics, when we get down to it, a question of proper communication. Is GE’s ‘moral content of the judicial law’ substantially different from theonomy’s ‘the judicial law is part of the moral law, with some parts peculiar to the circumstance’? I don’t believe it is.
If it weren’t for the last point, I’d be accusing Wolfe of being a theonomist. So far, he seems to be passionately arguing that theonomy is wrong/ incongruent with Reformed tradition because it doesn’t hold [the actual theonomic position, in different terminology]. Lest you accuse me of not knowing what theonomy is: I’m partway through the third volume of Rushdoony’s Institutes of Biblical Law. I know what I speak of. And, frankly, I do not find theonomy any more novel than denial of the papacy would have been in 1500. Sola Scriptura.
Wolfe in his third point reaches the only substantial difference I can find: general equity is willing to use ‘natural law’ and theonomy is not. (Wolfe also asserts that theonomy isn’t willing to use ‘reasoning’ to the same extent, but as a reader of theonomists and a theonomist myself, I can assure you theonomy involves plenty of logic.) Now, here’s a real difference. Theonomists generally find ‘natural law’- an inherent awareness of morality accessible by extra-Scriptural means- to be either suspect or unusable. The Reformers (who perhaps we should admit had some problems) were more willing to use natural law, though they certainly didn’t partition Scripture away from it the way Thomas Aquinas was liable to. So, at last, we have a real difference, one Wolfe never really addresses the Scripture on and which most of his Reformer-quotes don’t deal with. And for this one….
I, like Solomon (Prov. 3:5), disagree with the use of natural law. Now, if by natural law you mean ‘the requirements made by man’s nature on him, either as a matter of authority or as a matter of cause-and-effect’, I’ve no issue with it (and sometimes the Reformers seem to me to use the term in that meaning as much as the most epistemological one). The law of man’s nature, the law that A results in B physically or morally, is part of what Scripture teaches us. But the use of a ‘natural law’ which is revelation of God’s law outside of Scripture? I reject that; I’ve read 2 Timothy 3:1-6-17, Proverbs 3:5, Jeremiah 17:9, 1 Samuel 15:23, and many more.
We should not take the word of the Reformers as certain any more than they took the word of Rome as certain. While many of them wise and insightful, they were flawed, and their theology can be refined. Moreover, if we consider their theology, we find that it is not hostile to theonomy in the overall tenor except in that incorporation of natural law. The basic principles of applying the judicial law appear without difficulty in many Reformers, going by the quotes Wolfe evidences (more on that in a future article, I hope), albeit under differing language; theonomy just refuses to add man’s innovations to God’s law (a distinction the Reformers didn’t have as a forefront part of their paradigm, the way we do nowadays). Theonomy is not a deviation from historic reformed thought: it is a development and purification, just as they did to each other, just as they did to Rome.
God bless.
