A Case for Christian Nationalism: Review
This is a semi-review of Stephen Wolfe’s controversial book The Case for Christian Nationalism, a review I wrote some time ago for a different venue, shortly after finishing the book. Having shifted the focus of this blog to include political theology, I thought I’d lightly edit it for release here.
Part One: My Presuppositions and Position
I’m approaching this as a Christian. Component to that, I also have several doctrinal distinctives that are relevant: Calvinism/ Reformed covenantal theology (similar to Wolfe) and a preference for presuppositional over classical apologetics (and argumentation) (unlike Wolfe).
I read the book out of doctrinal rather than historic interest. I will not, therefore, be addressing the historical assertions of the book, except to acknowledge that it has a significant amount of historical information I’ll be reviewing when I undertake a study of early American and Reformed protestant political theology.
I am comfortable with the term ‘Christian Nationalist’, though I am not certain I prefer it. Generally speaking, I desire a government which is at its core a Christian law-code, sharply limited to the Biblically defined sphere of governmental authority; further, I agree with Wolfe in asserting that a government has no authority to impose injustice or exceed its mandate, meaning that all such actions are actions of power, not authority, and should be treated as morally equivalent to mafia protection fees.
Part Two: The Good Part
I mostly agree with the large majority of Wolfe’s statements. If I had to ball-park it, I have about 90% agreement with 90% of what he says. I also have three significant problems with what he says in this book, problems I’ll get into in the third part of this post.
Wolfe makes his argument for a distinctively and explicitly Christian government and culture. He argues also for the maintenance of cultural and national distinctives. He’s not wrong in the main body; when I disagree, it’s mostly as a matter of emphasis. I’m not going to try to recapitulate his whole thesis; honestly, it’s close enough to my own position in most areas that I don’t remember his specific statements.
Chapter ten was particularly interesting, as it somewhat altered my own view, at least in potential (I’m still working through my conclusions). Wolfe argues that if a government behaves illegitimately (significant failures of its duty, significant exceeding of its proper bounds of authority, or significant acts of injustice) the people have the right to remove that government, if necessary by force. This removal, however, must be done not in service of anarchy but to replace it with a more properly ordered government; as a result, it is generally preferable to have the lesser magistracy intimately involved in the revolution/ reformation, in order to smoothly maintain a legitimate government.
The epilogue, I will admit, I’m still chewing on. Some parts are good sense; some parts I’d give different emphasis to. If there is a part of the book that isn’t being covered here, it’s the epilogue.
Part Three: The Problems
Problem 1
I object to Wolfe’s methodology and argumentation. Wolfe explicitly avoids direct Biblical argumentation, relying on natural law and a somewhat nebulous ‘Reformed tradition’, as well as more Aquinas than I like.
As a result, his arguments often strike me as either unnecessarily weak or slightly off-kilter. In the first case, very common, I may agree with the conclusion (usually do), but I am annoyed by the use of a sub-par argument for it. Herein my preference for presuppositional argumentation shows. Ideas as insane as cultural Marxism are perfectly logical once certain presuppositions are accepted. In theological matters, therefore, I do not trust arguments built upon ‘common ground with all mankind’, because I don’t believe it works. An atheist can ignore classical arguments for God’s existence all he wants if he’s already presupposed materialism. Further, when speaking as a Christian to Christians (or to non-Christians, in certain circumstances), I see no need to weaken my argument by leaving aside the infallible word of God in favor of more wobbly foundations in man’s cognition (there are other theological emphases at work here, but that’s enough for now).
Natural law arguments, moreover, often have very thick premises. If I state, “All men have certain inalienable rights,” we can both agree on that premise, but our agreement may be false. It can easily obscure somewhat different ideas of ‘rights’, ‘inalienable’, or even ‘all men’. An argument which uses such a premise, then, may appear formally invincible, may have its premises universally accepted, but fail to prove the conclusion to all as a result of a disagreement on a nuance of a premise which seemed unimportant at first. My smaller disagreements with Wolfe tended to include problems of this sort.
I also find myself dubious of his constant appeal to a Protestant tradition. While I acknowledge the wisdom of many of those he quotes, the book simply lacks space to analyze why they believed what they believed, to account for the vast breadth of thought in that tradition, and demonstrate the correctness of his historical conclusions, the strength of that conclusion’s authority. I would not have nearly as much doubt here if I were not aware of Wolfe’s fondness for Aquinas, a failing of certain parts of modern Protestantism.
Problem 2
Thus far, I have objected to Wolfe’s methods mainly, and only slightly to his conclusions. It is in chapter seven that we come to Wolfe’s most glaring problem-of-conclusion. In chapter seven, Wolfe stops just short of endorsing full autocracy, for utterly baffling reasons. In the process, too, he reveals an assumption I must differ with him in.
His argument rests in an assertion that the ideal Christian government is run by a ‘great man’ (which I take partially as a reference to the eponymous theory of history), as a natural result of respecting hierarchy. As further evidence of the advisability of autocracy, he adduces the current failures of ‘democracy.’ Here he is wrong, for numerous reasons.
To start with, his argument towards hierarchy lacks substantiation and fails to address any counterargument. In all honesty, it’s very, very thin, so thin it’s hard to argue against except by pointing out that ‘natural’ does not mean ‘good’. I argue that the position of President in the American system is a fairly decent (though still flawed) way of fulfilling what part of natural hierarchical arrangement is a good idea, a figurehead, guidepost, and leader, without creating true autocracy.
Next, his argument that democracy has failed has two major flaws. First, it ignores that the desirable Christian government is not a democracy but a law-centered representative republic. In such a system, the law rules, not the majority vote; the administration and expansion of that law is given by that law to representatives chosen by the people (this being historically the best way to slow tyranny, though far from perfect). The US Constitution is an example of such; America is ruled by the Constitution, where all federal authority derives, and that constitution is in theory administered by representatives (insofar as we have legitimate government) using authority delegated by the Constitution.
Second, Wolfe’s argument is historically incompetent. If we must compare the worst republics (I substitute republic for democracy, I think without distorting meaning) to the worst autocracies, we would compare our republic examples- modern Western nations and the late stage Roman Republic (possibly), maybe ancient Persia (a monarchy ruled by law)- not to a nebulous ‘autocracy’ but to concrete examples: the USSR, modern China, North Korea, Nero and Domitian’s Rome, etc. We’re bad, but we’re not that bad, not yet, so the republics win that comparison.
On the other hand, if we compare best to best, true autocracies come off even worse in comparison to law-ruled governments. I would rank the three best governments from best to worst as Moses’s Israel (at least in potential- they had societal problems), a law-ruled patriarchal representative state (representatives here being heads of household and clan leaders); historic America (we have a remarkable track record, esp. if we ignore the past few years, even with our problems, like slavery and abortion), a law-based representative republic; and post-Civil War England, a nation which while nominally a monarchy functions rather as a representative republic. None of them are perfect, but these three historically top the charts.
Further, he fails to recognize that his emphasis on cultural distinctives would enjoin that the ideal American government would be far from autocratic, given the long history of anti-autocracy inherent in this nation. He also utterly fails to provide Biblical arguments or address even the easiest Biblical counterargument (the warning given to Israel when they request a king that they should expect intolerable tyranny, like a draft and 10% taxation).
Problem 3
Wolfe asserts that the authority of government is present in the people as an association. I argue that the people lack governmental authority, specifically the authority of the sword. They have the authority, however, to form a government. The government they form is invested by God with authority to wield the sword, with the specific methods and forms subject to the peculiarities of the government’s structure. In the American system, the people do not have legislative or executive authority and only limited judicial authority (juries). They have, however, the authority to invest representatives with those authorities, with the derivative authority of the entire government coming from its constitution, whether federal or state.
Problem 4
Wolfe further asserts the state has the right to restrict the religious activities of heretics. While I believe the government has the right to deny certain privileges to false religion that Christianity should possess (for instance: a church, if culturally appropriate, should have the right to church bells; a mosque should have no allowance for a call to prayer siren), I deny that the government has the power to define heresy, as would be required for legislative, executive, or judicial action towards such. I don’t trust the government with that power.
Finale: My Overall Impression
The Case for Christian Nationalism is a good book, worth reading if you’re interested in the topic, especially if you already have some familiarity. It’s a very flawed book, though. I can see, reading it, why some people think Christian Nationalists are crazy people who want Francisco Franco 2.0; because Wolfe leans a little too far in that direction. It frustrates me as a strategic and rhetorical disservice to more sober-minded ‘Christian nationalists’.