Substack Archive

God’s Law on Legal Insanity

A few weeks after the internet melted down over a child-murderer.

In the spirit of jumping on the trend several weeks too late, let’s consider the moral foundation for ‘not guilty by reason of insanity,’ the concept of legal insanity, and the Scriptural stance on the question. (Quickly, because this is a large topic.)

Legal insanity, as the orthodoxy of American law would have it, is one of two inabilities: inability to perceive reality (i.e. hallucination) or inability to recognize a behavior’s reprehensibility. These two, apparently similar, are not actually similar at all- unless you accept the presupposition of liberalism, that morality is basically a function of rationality or perception, or of liberal government, that reprehensibility attaches to a behavior not because of its relationship with God, as perceived through the conscience and through conscious knowledge, but because of its relationship with the government, which assuredly can be obscured by insanity (but not by ignorance, apparently).

Biblically, the second of these has almost no credibility. Man is integrally aware of the fundamentals of morality (Rom. 1:18-20). He could not sin otherwise (Rom. 7:7-10). In other words, every man is well aware that murder is wrong, that theft is wrong, that such clear sins are wrong; at this point, he may or may not recognize that the government has jurisdiction over them, but such recognition is irrelevant to the jurisdiction. As such, Christians know that ‘insanity’ consisting of inability to recognize morality is merely very refined self-deception, incapable of preventing guilt (unless it is actually insanity of the other type), being not true obliviousness. The only place where the Biblical and American verdicts converge is when the crime is no sin at all (and thus not properly in the government’s jurisdiction).

Before considering the other type of insanity, we must conduct a brief taxonomy of two types of crime in Scripture’s law-code. In both types, the law establishes a means of justice, of making-right, of reducing one in proportion to the reduction he inflicted on another. The first type, however, uses destruction to that end. In mild cases, this means corporal punishment (Deut. 25:3); in the more typical examples, this means death (Num. 36). The second type involves crimes not so permanent as the other; here, transfer is used instead of destruction. Specifically, these crimes are addressed by forced (preferably voluntary) restitution from the criminal to the victim (Ex.22).

In the second genre of crime, we have no good Biblical grounds, as I see it, to exonerate on grounds of the ‘I did not apprehend the facts’ variety of legal insanity. A theft by accident is as properly solved by restitution as an intentional theft, and indeed it will be so solved so soon as the thief is made aware, unless he wants to graduate the unintentional theft to an intentional one. Scripture, indeed, never provides that intention should matter for the sentence of the law, though certainly it matters for the conscience of the thief. Insanity-based misperception of a theft as not-a-theft therefore should be irrelevant when the crime is properly dealt with by restitution.

In the first, however, we find grounds for a version of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity,’ albeit not for what we have in American law. Numbers 35:11 speaks of the man who kills “without intent” (which I interpret as one who brings about a foreseeable death, such as leaving a heavy tool balanced on a high place, not one party to an unforeseeable tragedy, such as a man dying due to shock at a stranger saying ‘Hi’). This man is punished, but instead of the death penalty he receives exile from his home to one of the ‘cities of refuge’ established by God, for the duration of the current high priest’s life (potentially decades), subject to a trial in which he has to prove his lack of intent (or, presumably, that he didn’t do it and therefore the entire sentence should be withdrawn).

How to mirror this penalty in modern jurisprudence is a bit of a puzzle, I’ll admit. But the import in the specific issue of hallucination-insanity murder is fairly clear: the insanity removes the intent but not the act. If the failure of perception was in any way foreseeable, therefore, the sentence should be reduced but not removed; if the insanity was completely unforeseeable, no guilt attaches and therefore no criminality can attach either (Rom. 13:1-4), though the person who commits the act is guilty of attempted-murder-through-negligence unless he takes reasonable, thorough steps to prevent the recurrence of the insanity or of its effects.

I should note that this only applies when the hallucination changes the actual act. When the hallucination changes the motivation- such as in the case of the mother who alleged a belief that she had to kill her children to prevent the devil from getting their souls (no, this isn’t the Clancy case)- the insanity does not remove the intent and therefore does not at all change the propriety of the death penalty.

Now, admittedly, I have argued here entirely on the basis of murder. Should kidnapping-for-sale, bestiality, homosexuality, rape, and the several other capital crimes receive similar treatment? Should assault, punished according to Leviticus 24:15-21? I believe so. Scripture treats the crimes similarly, insofar as it deals with each of them, and we can properly use murder, which receives the most in-depth treatment, as a model for our full understanding of the law on the rest, just as we use the law on convicting for murder (Deut. 17:6) in other criminal proceedings, as confirmed by Deuteronomy 19:15, and in non-criminal matters, such as the church’s evaluations (matt. 18:16) and soteriology (Heb. 10:28-29).

So, in sum:

  • Legal insanity has two types: misperception of facts and misperception of morals.
  • Misperception of morals is usable in the liberal worldview, but it is not supported by Scripture.
  • Scripture presents us with two categories of crime: those answered by proportional destruction (whether pain, exile, or death) and those answered by proportional restitution (typically economic).
  • Misperception of facts is not usable when restitution is the proper option.
  • Misperception of facts mitigates but typically does not exonerate those crimes which are properly punished by destruction.

God bless.

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