Stephen Wolfe takes on theonomy, and it doesn’t go well.

I must confess to being disappointed by the chapter of A Study Report on Reformed Christian Politics (by Stephen Wolfe et al) which dealt with theonomy. I did not expect Wolfe to convince me to abandon the position; I’ve studied the matter fairly thoroughly, and I’ve no doubt whatsoever about the core truths, even as I refine the periphery perpetually, with occasional change to the midrange. But I did expect to have to pause and work through some tough arguments. And… Well, I had to pause, occasionally, but mostly to analyze how ineffective the arguments were. If Wolfe has strong arguments, he didn’t show them here.

Now, the book(?) isn’t intended as a pure refutation of theonomy, I acknowledge; the chapter’s purpose (as explained in the introduction) is to “critique theonomy and analyze the Reformed tradition’s understanding of the Mosaic law” (8). The problem is with that critique (and some with the analysis). Wolfe (who I’ll be using to indicate the report’s authors as a whole, for shorthand) simply doesn’t present any effective critiques of theonomy, aside from showing that other positions were present and influential in the Reformation (which isn’t a critique in any meaningful sense).

Wolfe asserts that the Westminster Confession’s ‘general equity’ “refers to the universal and common application of the moral law as contained in the judicial law” (8). The refinement of this summary, in the chapter’s body, is that the judicial laws of the Old Testament do not bind the civil magistrate in the New Covenant, but that they do “oblige” civil governments to obey their moral content, their moral teaching for civil government (130-131).

I honestly don’t see the difference between these two. What is the difference between ‘binding’ and ‘obliging’? Wolfe apparently expects it to be obvious. Further….

No serious theonomist (and I have read Rushdoony plenty) believes the judicial laws of the Old Testament are to be implemented in modern society without interpretation or adaptation to circumstances. One classic example of this is the command to put up a roof parapet in Deuteronomy 22:8, which theonomy takes to establish the moral principle that people are to provide sufficient means to prevent foreseeable accidents. In other words, theonomists see in the Old Testament judicial code a set of commands for men-as-civil-magistrates (and all citizens are in some function civil magistrates), moral commands which should be applied in the same way that we apply other moral commands of the law.

Worry not, though, for there are differences between Wolfe’s position and theonomy, expressible as roughly four points.

First, he holds that the Mosaic code has ‘expired.’ This means, so far as I can tell, that as Israel no longer exists, the Mosaic code is no longer a literal, operative legal code, and that it was so limited to Israel anyway as to be unusable outside of Israel (125). This expiration means that instead of applying the laws verbatim to the circumstances, Reformed theologians in the Wolfe-perceived tradition would apply the law’s moral principles to the circumstances. (Once again, it’s hard to see a difference with theonomy here; I’d offer that the different seems more semantic than actual)

Second, Wolfe holds that the Reformed tradition sees the “Mosaic judicial law” as “never intended to serve as a manual for all civil governments, and thus… insufficient for modern nations,” stating that “the judicial laws also do not cover important areas of governance” (126). I at this point have to ask Wolfe if he has really read Rushdoony, whose three-volume Institutes of Biblical Law demonstrates the theonomic understanding extensively, if not perfectly. Theonomists have shown from Scripture that Scripture does cover all the parts of government which are moral. If Wolfe wants to argue that point, he can start by arguing with 2 Timothy 3:16-17; he can start by showing that God’s word is not sufficient to make the man of God “complete, equipped for every good work.”

Third, besides seeing Scripture as an insufficient guide to good works in government, Wolfe believes that even what we have should be subjected to what Rushdoony (apparently borrowing from Charles Hodge) calls ‘discretion.’ In brute words, ‘discretion’ is the interpreter making the choice as to which parts of the law are applicable in his circumstances and leaving the rest out, even if the native meaning of the text suggests it should be applicable. So he might take the law against murder, keep the prohibition, and omit the punishment on grounds of ‘circumstances’ (134-135). Apparently the nature of murder has changed since Moses’s time, and capital punishment might not actually be justice for murder (Wolfe approves of applying that particular punishment, but he does so on his own discretion, not as a matter of Scriptural command).

Fourth, then, is Wolfe’s solution to insufficiency and the means by which discretion (the choice of which parts of Scripture matter) is to be applied: natural law. ‘Right reason’ applied to the world, human judgement, human discretion, this is the solution, the civil magistrate’s (ultimate) guide.

Conclusion

Wolfe is wrong. Wolfe is badly wrong. Wolfe is promoting antinomianism and nosing towards the Tiber with his hermeneutic.

Good day, and God bless.